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This paper presents a general framework for analysing stochastic stability
in models with evolution at two levels. Under certain conditions the theory of
nearly-complete decomposability can be used to disentangle these two levels.
They can then be studied separately and the equilibrium of one can be used to
obtain the equilibrium of the other. This gives an approximation of the equi-
librium of the combined dynamics. This approached is applied to a model of
conjectural variation and imitation in Cournot oligopoly. If behavioural change
takes place infrequently, the Walrasian equilibrium is the unique stochastically
stable outcome. As a corollary, it is indicated that smaller industries are more
competitive than larger ones.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, many papers and books have used the concept of stochastic stabil-
ity to explain equilibrium selection in games. Most of these models follow the same
structure.1 One starts by modelling a particular kind of dynamic behaviour in dis-
crete time that evolves according to a Markov chain. This gives the pure dynamics.
One can think, for example, of symmetric Cournot oligopoly where at each point in
time ¯rms imitate the output of the ¯rm with highest pro¯ts in the previous period.
Vega{Redondo (1997) shows that this dynamics has numerous equilibria (absorbing
states), namely all those states where all ¯rms produce the same quantity (the so-
called monomorphic states). In order to select between all these equilibria, the pure
dynamics is then perturbed by random noise, leading to the perturbed dynamics. In
the oligopoly example, one assumes that with a certain small probability each ¯rm
chooses a random quantity. The stochastically stable states are those states that get
positive probability mass in the limit distribution2 as the random noise component
vanishes. In the oligopoly example Vega{Redondo (1997) shows that the Walrasian
equilibrium is the unique stochastically stable state, thus giving an evolutionary
underpinning of Walrasian behaviour.
Stochastic stability has been analysed to study, for example, evolution in biology
(e.g. Foster and Young (1990)), the evolution of conventions (e.g. Young (1993)),
equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games (e.g. Kandori et al. (1993)), and a
plethora of other ¯elds. In oligopoly theory, stochastic stability has been applied
in the seminal Vega{Redondo (1997) as outlined above. This model has been ex-
tended to study, for example, entry and exit (Al¶ os-Ferrer et al. (1999)), Bertrand
competition (Al¶ os-Ferrer et al. (2000)) the comparison between Cournot and Wal-
rasian equilibrium (Al¶ os-Ferrer (2004)), and the interaction between di®erent types
of behaviour (e.g. Schipper (2003) and Kaarb¿e and Tieman (1999)).
One crucial assumption in all these models is that agents may change their de-
cisions, but never the behaviour that leads to these decisions. In Vega{Redondo
(1997), for example, all ¯rms are pro¯t imitators. Even if there are multiple be-
havioural rules present in the population (as in e.g. Schipper (2003)), players can-
not change their behaviour. This is a very restrictive assumption. One would like
to be able to study models where agents can choose between di®erent behavioural
rules.3 In a repeated non-cooperative game, this would lead to two levels of dynam-
1For a textbook exposition see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
2The limit distribution is also called the \invariant probability measure", or \equilibrium dis-
tribution". The latter term can be confusing as the limit distribution need not correspond to an
equilibrium of the underlying game.
3In a static context this is studied in the literature on indirect evolution. See, for example, GÄ uth
2ics. Given a con¯guration of behavioural rules for all players there is a dynamics of
strategy choices, the strategy dynamics. At a higher level of aggregation, given the
results of behavioural rules, players switch between di®erent behavioural rules, the
behavioural dynamics. The question then is how the two levels in°uence each other
and what behaviour and strategy combinations result in stochastically stable states.
A major problem with such an analysis is that the resulting Markov chain de-
scribing the dynamics becomes very complicated. This paper discusses a very intu-
itive way of disentangling the two types of dynamics and, hence, obtaining a good
approximation of the limit distribution of the original Markov chain. This approach
is basically an application of the theory of nearly-complete decomposability as de-
veloped by Ando and Fisher (1963), Simon and Ando (1961), and Courtois (1977).
Originally, this theory was developed to aggregate over large dynamic systems in
the presence of limited computational power. The main idea is that under certain
conditions one can study the two levels of dynamics separately. Intuitively, this
means that one uses the limit distribution of the strategy dynamics to obtain the
limit distribution of the behavioural dynamics. The theory of nearly-completely de-
composable systems provides an upper bound on the interaction between the two
dynamics below which the latter limit distribution is a good approximation of the
limit distribution of the original Markov chain.
To illustrate the way this theory can be used, we study an extension to Vega{
Redondo (1997). We consider a Cournot oligopoly with a ¯nite number of identical
¯rms. The strategy dynamics is driven by best responses given conjectural vari-
ations. For each con¯guration of conjectural variations this dynamics leads to a
di®erent equilibrium. In particular, there are con¯gurations that lead to the Wal-
rasian, Cournot-Nash, and Cartel equilibria. At the behavioural level it is assumed
that ¯rms imitate the behaviour (i.e. the conjectural variation) of the ¯rm with
the highest pro¯t. It is shown that if behavioural change does not take place too
frequently (a notion made precise below), Walrasian behaviour is (approximately)
the unique stochastically stable state. This result rea±rms the strength of the
Walrasian idea in competitive markets. A crucial assumption, however, is that be-
havioural change takes place at a su±ciently low rate. The upper bound on this
rate is decreasing in the number of ¯rms. If behavioural change takes place more
frequently, the support of the limit distribution may consist of more elements than
just the Walrasian equilibrium, indicating that larger industries may inherently be
less competitive than smaller industries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the general
and Yaari (1992), or Possajennikov (2000) for an application to oligopoly theory.
3framework is discussed. The theory of nearly-completely decomposable systems
is described Section 3. In Section 4 we develop a model of Cournot oligopoly to
illustrate the theory and Section 5 concludes.





be a game in normal form. Let S =
Q
i2In Si. This game
is in¯nitely repeated. At every time t = 0;1;2;:::, the con¯guration of strategy
choices is denoted by st = (sit)i2In, where sit 2 Si is the strategy chosen by player
i at time t. It is assumed that every player i 2 In can choose from a ¯nite set Bi of
behavioural rules. A behavioural rule is a correspondence Bi : S ! Si, with typical
element sit = Bi;t¡1(st¡1), where Bi;t¡1 denotes the behavioural rule that player
i 2 In chose at time t ¡ 1.4 That is, Bi;t¡1(st¡1) describes the strategy choice of
player i at time t, given the strategy choices of all players and player i's choice of
behavioural rule at time t¡1.5 Furthermore, the fact that strategy choice at time t
is in°uenced by behavioural choice at time t ¡ 1 suggests that strategy choices are
made at the beginning of each period, whereas behavioural choices are made at the
end.
It is assumed that players adapt their strategy choice with probability p 2 (0;1)
every period. So, with probability p, sit 2 Bi;t¡1(st¡1), and with probability 1 ¡ p,
sit = si;t¡1. If Bi;t¡1(st¡1) contains more than one element, player i chooses an
element at random according to a probability measure, ´i, with full support. The
aforementioned dynamics describe the pure strategy dynamics.
The actual strategy choice can be in°uenced by several aspects. For example, a
player can make a mistake and choose another strategy than her behavioural rule
prescribes. Another possibility is that a player experiments and consciously chooses
another strategy. Finally, a player may be replaced by another player who has the
same behaviour, but chooses a di®erent strategy at ¯rst. Since these e®ects are
outside the model, they are treated as stochastic perturbations. To model these
perturbations at the strategy level, it is assumed that with probability " > 0 a
player chooses an element from S randomly according to a probability distribution,
ºi, with full support.
4This formulation should not necessarily be interpreted as a player choosing a behavioural rule
out of free will. The possibility that choice of behaviour is determined by, for example, genetics or
evolutionary forces is not a priori excluded.
5This formulation does not explicitly include memory longer than one period. Models can,
however, relatively easily be transformed to include ¯nite memory. See, for example, Al¶ os-Ferrer
et al. (1999).
4Let s(k), k = 1;:::;m, and BI, I = 1;:::;N, denote the k-th and I-th per-
mutation of S and B =
Q
i2In Bi, respectively. Then, pure strategy dynamics and
perturbations, together, lead to a Markov chain on S with transition matrix M"
I(k;l),























where 1 1(¢) denotes the indicator function and the part between square brackets gives
the transition probabilities for the pure strategy dynamics.
The behavioural dynamics takes place at the end of period t, when each player i
gets the opportunity to revise its behaviour with probability 0 < ~ p < 1. Behavioural
change can be thought of as a conscious or non-conscious change. In the case of
conscious change one could think that once in a while a player analyses her past
performance and assesses the payo®s her behaviour yield by comparing with the
payo®s of the other players. The importance of relative payo®s has already been
stressed by Alchian (1950). It is assumed that each player knows the model and
can observe the choices of other players and can, therefore, deduce the behaviour
of the other players as well. She can then change her behaviour accordingly. Since
deriving the other players' behaviour requires more cognitive e®ort than simply
following a behavioural rule in choosing a strategy, it seems reasonable to assume
that players change their behaviour less often than their strategy choices which
could be re°ected in assuming that ~ p < p. Non-conscious behavioural change can,
for example, be thought of as genetic change, where \weaker genes" are replaced
by \stronger" genes, leading to a Darwinian survival of the ¯ttest. Again, it seems
reasonable to assume that behavioural change takes place at a lower frequency than
strategy change.
For each player i 2 In, behavioural change is governed by a correspondence
~ Bi : B £ S ! Bi. That is, given the strategy choices (s1;t¡1;:::;sn;t¡1) 2 S and
the behavioural rules (B1;t¡1;:::;Bn;t¡1) 2 B, player i chooses a behavioural rule
at time t such that





If ~ Bi(¢) does not consist of a unique element, player i chooses any element from ~ B(¢)
using a probability measure ~ ´i(¢) with full support.
This dynamic process constitutes the pure behavioural dynamics. Just as in
5the strategy dynamics, random perturbations are added.6 So, each player chooses
with probability ~ " > 0 any behavioural rule using a probability measure ~ ºi(¢) with
full support. For each k 2 f1;:::;mg and corresponding strategy vector s(k), the
behavioural dynamics gives rise to a Markov chain on B with transition matrix ¸~ "
k,










i 2 ~ Bi(BI;s(k))
¢~ ´i(BJ
i )













where the part between square brackets gives the transition probabilities for the
pure behavioural dynamics.
The combined strategy and behavioural dynamics yield a Markov chain on S£B
with transition matrix Q";~ ". For future convenience, it is assumed that entries in this
transition matrix are grouped according to the behavioural index. So, the k-th row
in Q";~ " consists of the transition probabilities from the state with behavioural rules
B1 and strategies s(k). Similarly, the m(I ¡ 1) + k-th row contains the transition
probabilities from the state with behavioural rules BI and strategies s(k). A typical
element of Q";~ " is given by
Q";~ "(kI;lJ) = M"
I(k;l)¸~ "
k(I;J);
which should be read as the transition probability form the state with behavioural
rules BI and strategies s(k) to the state with behavioural rules BJ and strategies
s(l). Note that, for every " > 0 and every ~ " > 0, this Markov chain is ergodic (i.e.
Q";~ " is irreducible) and, hence, has a unique limit distribution.






This is the transition matrix of the Markov chain that results after the stochastic
perturbations at the strategy and behavioural level have converged to zero, respec-
tively. The order of taking limits is essential to the analysis. The stochastically
stable states are de¯ned to be those states that have positive probability mass in
the limit distribution, ¹(¢), of Q. The dynamics in Q is complicated due to the in-
teraction between the strategy and the behavioural levels. Therefore, the techniques
developed in Freidlin and Wentzell (1984), which are usually used to determine the
stochastically stable state will, in general, be hard to apply.
6In the case of non-conscious behavioural change, these perturbations can be thought of as
mutations.
6One way of proceeding is to decompose the Markov chain Q. Let for every
I = 1;:::;N, Q¤
I = lim"#0 M"
I. The standard techniques as applied in most of the
literature (cf. Young (1998)) can be used to the unique limit distribution of Q¤
I,
denoted by ¹I(¢). Then, construct a Markov chain on B, ~ Q, where ¹I(¢) is used
to aggregate over the strategy dynamics. That is the transition probabilities in ~ Q
are based on the assumption that the strategy dynamics has settled in equilibrium.
Standard techniques can then be used to obtain the limit distribution, ~ ¹(¢) of ~ Q.
The theory of nearly-complete decomposability gives conditions on when ~ ¹(¢) is a
good approximation of the measure of interest, ¹(¢).
3 Nearly-complete Decomposability
Intuitively, a nearly-completely decomposable system is a Markov chain where the
matrix of transition probabilities can be divided into blocks such that the interaction
between blocks is small relative to interaction within blocks. This section presents
the formal theory.7 In the remainder, let Q be an n£n irreducible stochastic matrix,
representing, for example, the transition matrix of an ergodic Markov chain. The
dynamic process (yt)t2I N, where yt 2 I Rn for all t 2 I N, is then given by
(yt+1)> = (yt)>Q: (2)
Note that Q can be written as follows:
Q = Q¤ + ³C; (3)





















I, I = 1;:::;N, are irreducible stochastic matrices of order n(I).
Hence, n =
PN
I=1 n(I). Therefore the sums of the rows of C are zero. We choose ³























where the kI denotes the k-th element in the I-th block. The parameter ³ is called
the maximum degree of coupling between subsystems Q¤
I.
It is assumed that all eigenvalues of Q and Q¤ are distinct. Then the spectral









¸(kI) is the kI-th maximal eigenvalue in absolute value of Q, v(kI) is the corre-
sponding eigenvector normalised to one using the vector norm k¢k1, and s(kI) is the
condition number s(kI) = v(kI)>v(kI). Since Q is a stochastic matrix, the Perron-
Frobenius theorem gives that the maximal eigenvalue of Q equals 1. Therefore, (7)
can be rewritten as









If one de¯nes for each matrix Q¤
I in a similar way Z¤(kI), s¤(kI), ¸¤(kI), and v¤(kI),
e.g. ¸¤(kI) is the k-th maximal eigenvalue in absolute value of Q¤
I, then one can ¯nd










using the fact that v¤
kI(1I) = n(I)¡1 for all kI. The behaviour through time of yt
and y¤






are, therefore, also speci¯ed by (8) and (9). The behaviour of yt can be seen as long-
run behaviour whereas y¤
t describes short-run behaviour. The comparison between
both processes follows from two theorems as stated by Simon and Ando (1961).
8See, for example, Lay (1994, Section 8.1).
8Theorem 1 For an arbitrary positive real number », there exists a number ³» such





for any 2 · k · n(I), 1 · I · N, where 1 · p;q · n.
Theorem 2 For an arbitrary positive real number !, there exists a number ³! such














It can be shown that for all I = 1;:::;N, ¸(1I) is close to unity. Therefore ¸t(1I)
will also be close to unity for small t. Hence, the ¯rst two terms on the right-hand
side of (8) will not vary much for t < T2, for some T2 > 0. The ¯rst term of the right-
hand-side of (9) does not change at all. Hence, for t < T2 the behaviour through
time of yt and y¤
t is determined by the last terms of Qt and (Q¤)t, respectively. Also,
if ³ ! 0 it can be shown that ¸(kI) ! ¸¤(kI) and from Theorem 1 it follows that
Z(kI) ! Z¤(kI), for all k = 2;:::;n(I) and I = 1;:::;N. This means that for ³
small and t < T2 the paths of yt and y¤
t are very close.
The eigenvalues ¸¤(kI) are strictly less than unity in absolute value for all k =
2;:::;n(I), and I = 1;:::;N. For any positive real number »1 we can therefore













¯ ¯ < »1 for t > T¤
1:









¯ ¯ ¯ < »1 for t > T1:
Theorem 1 plus convergence of the eigenvalues with ³ then ensures that T1 ! T¤
1 as
³ ! 0. We can always choose ³ such that T2 > T1. As long as ³ is not identical to
zero it holds that ¸(1I) is not identical to unity for I = 2;:::;N.9 Therefore, there











¯ < »3 for t > T3:
9If ³ = 0, all blocks QI are irreducible and then we would have ¸(1I) = ¸
¤(1I) = 1 for all I.
9This implies that for T2 < t < T3, the last term of Qt is negligible and the path of yt
is determined by the ¯rst two components of Qt. According to Theorem 2 it holds
that for any I and J the elements of Z(1K),
ZkI1J(1K);:::;ZkIlJ(1K);:::;ZkIn(J)J(1K);
depend essentially on I, J and l, and are almost independent of k. So, for any I
and J they are proportional to the elements of the eigenvector of Q¤
J corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue. Since Q¤ is stochastic and irreducible, this eigenvector
corresponds to the limit distribution ¹¤
J of the Markov chain with transition matrix
Q¤
J. Thus, for T2 < t < T3 the elements of the vector yt, (ylJ)t, will approximately
have a constant ratio that is similar to that of the elements of ¹¤
J. Finally, for t > T3
the behaviour of yt is almost completely determined by the ¯rst term of Qt. So, yt
evolves towards v(11), which corresponds to the limit distribution ¹ of the Markov
chain with transition matrix Q. Summarising, the dynamics of yt can be described
as follows.
1. Short-run dynamics: t < T1. The predominant terms in Qt and (Q¤)t are the
last ones. Hence, yt and y¤
t evolve similarly.
2. Short-run equilibrium: T1 < t < T2. The last terms of Qt and (Q¤)t have
vanished while for all I, ¸t(1I) remains close to unity. A similar equilibrium
is therefore reached within each subsystem of Q and Q¤.
3. Long-run dynamics: T2 < t < T3. The predominant term in Qt is the second
one. The whole system moves to equilibrium, while the short-run equilibria in
the subsystems are approximately maintained.
4. Long-run equilibrium: t > T3. The ¯rst term of Qt dominates. Therefore, a
global equilibrium is attained.
The above theory implies that one can estimate ¹(¢) by calculating ¹¤
I for I =
1;:::;N, and the invariant measure ~ ¹ of the process
(~ yt+1)> = (~ yt)>P; (10)
where (~ yI)t =
Pn(I)
k=1(ykI)t for all I = 1;:::;N, and some transition matrix P. For
t > T2 we saw that
(ykI)t
(~ yI)t ¼ ¹¤
I;k. Hence, the probability of a transition from group
I to group J is given by
















QkIlJ ´ pIJ: (11)
So, by taking P = [pIJ], the process in (10) gives a good approximation for t > T2
of the entire process (yt)t2I N.
Until now we have not been concerned by how large ³ can be. It was stated that
for T¤
1 < t < T2, the original system Q is in a short-run equilibrium close to the
equilibrium of the completely decomposable system Q¤. If this is to occur it must
hold that T¤
1 < T2. Every matrix Q can be written in the form of (3), but not for
all matrices it holds that T ¤
1 < T2. Systems that satisfy the condition T ¤
1 < T2 are
called nearly-completely decomposable systems (cf. Ando and Fisher (1963)). Since
T¤
1 is independent of ³ and T2 increases with ³ ! 0, the condition is satis¯ed for ³
su±ciently small.
The main results concerning nearly-complete decomposability are given in the
theorem below.
Theorem 3 (Courtois (1977)) Let Q be an irreducible stochastic matrix, with a









then Q is nearly-completely decomposable. Furthermore, the limit distribution of the
Markov chain with transition matrix P, as de¯ned in (11) gives an O(³) approxi-
mation of the limit distribution of Q.
4 An Application: Cournot Oligopoly with Conjectural
Variations and Imitation
In this section, an application of the theory of nearly-completely decomposable sys-
tems to stochastic stability with multi-level evolution is discussed. Let be given a
dynamic market for a homogeneous good with n ¯rms, indexed by In = f1;2;:::;ng.
At each point in time, t 2 I N, competition takes place in a Cournot fashion,
i.e. by means of quantity setting. Inverse demand is given by a smooth function
P : I R+ ! I R+ satisfying P0(¢) < 0. The production technology is assumed to be
the same for each ¯rm and is re°ected by a smooth cost function C : I R+ ! I R+,
satisfying C0(¢) > 0 and either C00(¢) > 0 or C00(¢) < 0. If at time t 2 I N the vector
of quantities is given by q 2 I Rn
+, the pro¯t for ¯rm i 2 In at time t is given by
¼(qi;q¡i) = P(qi + Q¡i)qi ¡ C(qi);
11where q¡i = (qj)j6=i and Q¡i =
P
j6=i qj.
Each ¯rm i 2 In chooses quantities from a ¯nite grid ¡i. De¯ne ¡ =
Q
i2In ¡i.
For further reference let q(k), k = 1;:::;m, be the k-th permutation of ¡. It is
assumed that in setting their quantities ¯rms conjecture that their change in quantity
results in an immediate change in the total quantity provided by their competitors.
This can also be seen to re°ect the ¯rm's conjecture of the competitiveness of the
market. Formally, ¯rm i 2 In conjectures a value for the partial derivative of Q¡i
with respect to qi. Using this conjecture, the ¯rm wants to maximise next period's
pro¯t. Hence, the ¯rm is a myopic optimiser, which re°ects its bounded rationality.







qi + P(qi + Q¡i) ¡ C0(qi) = 0: (13)
As can be seen from (13) we assume that there is only a ¯rst order conjecture e®ect.
Furthermore, we assume that this e®ect is linear. These assumptions add to the
¯rm's bounded rationality.10
To facilitate further analysis, the conjectures are parameterised by a vector ® 2








Given a vector of conjectures an equilibrium for the market is given by q 2 I Rn
+ such
that for all i 2 In the ¯rst-order condition (13) is satis¯ed. Note that if all ¯rms
i 2 In have the conjecture ®i = ¡1, the equilibrium coincides with the Walrasian
equilibrium. Furthermore, if all ¯rms have ®i = 2¡n
n or ®i = 1, the equilibrium
coincides with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium or the cartel equilibrium, respectively.
Therefore, the conjectures ®i = ¡1, ®i = 2¡n
n , and ®i = 1 will be called the
Walrasian, Cournot-Nash, and cartel conjectures, respectively.
Each ¯rm chooses its conjecture from a ¯nite grid ¤ on [¡1;1], where it is
assumed that ¤ ¾ f¡1; 2¡n
n ;1g. The bounds of this ¯nite grid represent the extreme
cases of full competition (® = ¡1) and cartel (® = 1). For further reference, let
®(I), I = 1;:::;N, be the I-th permutation of ¤n =
Q
i2In ¤.
This model is a special case of the general framework presented in Section 2.
The pure strategy dynamics is such that ¯rm i 2 In seeks to ¯nd qt
i 2 ¡i so as
to approximate as closely as possible the ¯rst-order condition (13). That is, qt
i 2
10The ¯rst-order and linearity assumptions are also made throughout the static literature on




i ), where11 for q¡i 2
Q
j6=i ¡j and ®i 2 ¤i,
B(q¡i;®i) = argmin
q2¡i
n¯ ¯ ¯P0(q + Q¡i)(1 + ®i)
n
2




The pure behavioural dynamics consists of ¯rms imitating at time t the conjec-
ture of the ¯rm(s) with the highest pro¯t in period t¡1.12 Formally, ¯rm i's choice
®t
i is such that ®t
i 2 ~ B(®t¡1;qt), where for given ® 2 ¤n and q 2 ¡,
~ B(®;q) = argmax
°2¤
n
9j2In : ®j = °;8k2In : ¼(qj;q¡j) ¸ ¼(qk;q¡k)
o
:
The combined strategy and behavioural dynamics yield a Markov chain on ¡£¤n
with transition matrix Q";~ ". A typical element of Q";~ " is given by
Q";~ "(kI;lJ) = M"
I(k;l)¸~ "
k(I;J);
which should be read as the transition probability form the state with conjectures
®(I) and quantities q(k) to the state with conjectures ®(J) and quantities q(l). We












I be the limit Markov chain when the perturbations in the strategy dynamics
vanish. Note that MI has a unique limit distribution, ¹I(¢). To facilitate further
analysis it is assumed that for any vector of conjectures there is a unique equilibrium,
i.e. a unique vector of quantities that solves (13) for all ¯rms. Furthermore, we
assume that this equilibrium is an element of the quantity grid ¡.










i ) = 0:
Let the permutation on ¡ that corresponds to q® be denoted by k(I), i.e. q(k(I)) =
q®. The following proposition states that for each vector of conjectures ®(I) the
unique stochastically stable state of the strategy dynamics is given by q®(I).
Proposition 1 Let I 2 f1;:::;Ng be given. Under Assumption 1, the unique limit
distribution ¹I(¢) of the Markov chain with transition matrix Q¤
I is such that
¹I(q®(I)) = 1:
11From the de¯nition of behavioural rules, ®i is not an argument of Bi. We include it for
clari¯cation.
12Here, imitation takes place at the behavioural level, not at the strategy level (as in, for example,
Vega{Redondo (1997)).
13Proof. The proposition is proved using the theory developed by Milgrom and
Roberts (1991). First note that for all i 2 In, ¡i is a compact subset of I R+. De¯ne
for all i 2 In the (continuous) function ~ ¼i : I R+ £ I Rn¡1
+ ! I R+, given by
~ ¼i(qi;q¡i) = ¡
¯
¯ ¯P0(qi + Q¡i)(1 + ®i(I))
n
2
qi + P(qi + Q¡i) ¡ C0(qi)
¯
¯ ¯:




. Let S ½ ¡, denote by Si the
projection of S on ¡i and de¯ne S¡i =
Q
j6=i Sj. For all i 2 In the set of undominated














k ¸ 2, where U1(S) = U(S). Note that since q®(I) is unique we have
U1(¡) = fq®(I)g:
Following Milgrom and Roberts (1991) we say that fqtgt2I N is consistent with adap-
tive learning if
8^ t2I N9¹ t>^ t8~ t¸¹ t : q
~ t 2 U
¡
fqsj^ t · s < ~ tg
¢
:
Let ^ t 2 I N, take ¹ t = ^ t + 1 and let ~ t = ¹ t + k for some k 2 f0;1;2;:::g. Then
fqsj^ t · s < ~ tg = fqsjs = ^ t;:::;¹ t + k ¡ 1g:
Let fqtgt2I N be generated by the pure strategy dynamics, i.e. the strategy dynamics
without the random perturbations. Then we have, by de¯nition, that




¡i ) ¸ ~ ¼i(y;q
~ t¡1
¡i ):
Furthermore, it holds that q
~ t¡1 2 fqsj¹ t · s < ~ tg. Hence, we can conclude that
fqtgt2I N is consistent with adaptive learning. From Milgrom and Roberts (1991,
Theorem 7) one obtains that kqt ¡ q®(I)k ! 0 as t ! 1. Since ¡ is ¯nite we have
9¹ t2I N8t¸¹ t : qt = q®(I):
So, fq®(I)g is the only recurrent state of the pure strategy dynamics. From Young
(1993) we know that the stochastically stable states are among the recurrent states
of the mutation-free dynamics. Hence, ¹I(q®(I)) = 1. ¤
Before we turn to Proposition 2, the following lemma is introduced, which plays a
pivotal role in its proof. It compares the equilibrium pro¯ts for di®erent conjectures.
Suppose that the market is in a monomorphic state, i.e. all ¯rms have the same
conjecture. The question is what happens to equilibrium pro¯ts if k ¯rms deviate
14to another conjecture. If n ¡ k ¯rms have a conjecture equal to ® and k ¯rms have






















The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix A. Lemma 1 plays a similar role
as the claim in Vega{Redondo (1997, p. 381). The main result in that paper is driven
by the fact that if at least one ¯rm plays the Walrasian quantity against the other
¯rms playing another quantity, the ¯rm with the Walrasian quantity has a strictly
higher pro¯t. In our model the dynamics is more elaborate. Suppose that all ¯rms
have the Walrasian conjecture and that the strategy dynamics is in equilibrium, i.e.
the Walrasian equilibrium. If at least one player has another conjecture not only its
own equilibrium quantity changes, but also the equilibrium quantities of the ¯rms
that still have the Walrasian conjecture. Lemma 1 states that the ¯rms with the
lower conjecture still have the highest equilibrium pro¯t. This is intuitively clear
form the ¯rst-order condition (13). The ¯rms with the lower conjecture increase their
production until the di®erence between the price and the marginal costs reaches a
lower, but positive, level than the ¯rms with the higher conjecture. Therefore, the
total pro¯t of having a lower conjecture is higher. This happens because the ¯rms do
not realise that in the future their behaviour will be imitated by other ¯rms which
puts downward pressure on industry pro¯ts.
Some additional notation and assumptions are needed in the following. For
a matrix A let ¸j(A) denote the j-th largest eigenvalue in absolute value of A.
Furthermore, de¯ne ¸k(I;J) = lim
~ "#0
¸~ "








The following assumptions are made.
Assumption 2 All eigenvalues of Q are distinct.









Since the probability measures ºi(¢) and ~ ºi(¢) have full support for all i 2 In, all
eigenvalues of Q will generically be distinct and, hence, Assumption 2 will generically
be satis¯ed. Let ®(1) be the monomorphic state where all ¯rms have the Walrasian
conjecture, i.e. ®(1) = (¡1;:::;¡1) We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1{3 hold. Then there exists an ergodic
Markov chain on ¤n with transition matrix ~ Q and unique limit distribution ~ ¹(¢).
For ~ ¹(¢) it holds that ~ ¹(q®(1)) = 1. Furthermore, ~ ¹(¢) is an approximation of ¹(¢) of
order O(³).
15Proof. First, decompose Q as in (3)-(6). So, the transition matrix Q is decomposed
into a block diagonal matrix Q¤, where each diagonal block is the transition matrix
for the strategy dynamics for a given vector of conjectures, and a matrix that re-
°ects the behavioural dynamics. The constant ³ is the maximum degree of coupling
between subsystems Q¤
I.
Given the result of Proposition 1 one can aggregate Q using ¹I(¢) in the following




























Note that the transition matrix ~ Q is the limit of a sequence of ergodic Markov chains
with transition matrices ~ Q~ " with ~ Q~ "(I;J) = ¸~ "
k(I)(I;J). So, ~ Q has a unique limit
distribution ~ ¹(¢). Under Assumptions 2 and 3, Theorem 3 directly yields that ~ ¹(¢)
is an O(³) approximation of ¹(¢).
The result on ~ ¹(¢) is obtained by using the familiar techniques developed by
Freidlin and Wentzell (1984). First we establish the set of recurrent states for the
mutation-free dynamics of ~ Q~ ". This is the dynamics without the experimentation
part and is thus equal for all ~ " > 0. From (1) one can see that the transition
probabilities for this dynamics are equal to the transition probabilities of going
from one vector of conjectures ®(I) to another vector ®(J) given that the current
quantity vector is the equilibrium q®(I). So, the dynamics of ~ Q~ " is the pure conjecture
dynamics if the quantity dynamics gets su±cient time to settle in equilibrium. Let
the transition matrix for this aggregated pure conjecture dynamics be denoted by
~ Q0.
Lemma 2 The set A of recurrent states for the aggregated mutation-free conjecture




¯ ¯® 2 ¤
ª
:
The proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix B. De¯ne the costs between












¢. The cost between ®(I) and ®(J) is
the minimum number of mutations from ®(I) that is needed for the pure conjecture
dynamics to have positive probability of reaching ®(J). Let ® 2 ¤n. An ®-tree H®
is a collection of ordered pairs (®0;®00) such that:
1. every ®0 2 ¤nnf®g is the ¯rst element of exactly one pair;
2. for all ®0 2 ¤nnf®g there exists a path (®0;®1),(®1;®2),:::,(®s¡1;®s), (®s;®)
in H®.





First, we build an ®(1)-tree H¤ with minimal costs. Then it is shown that for any
state ® 2 Anf®(1)g and any ®-tree H® the costs will be higher. From Freidlin and
Wentzell (1984, Lemma 6.3.1) one can then conclude that ®(1) is the unique element
in the support of ~ ¹(¢). Young (1993) has shown that the minimum cost tree is among
the ®-trees where ® is an element of a recurrent class of the mutation-free dynamics.
Thus, from Lemma 2 we know that we only need to consider the monomorphic states
in A. This implies that for all ®-trees H®, ® 2 A, we have c(H®) ¸ jAj ¡ 1, since
one always needs at least one experiment to leave a monomorphic state.
Consider ®(1) and the ®(1)-tree H¤ that is constructed in the following way.
Let ® 2 Anf®(1)g. For all i 2 In we have ®i > ®i(1). Suppose that one ¯rm i
experiments to ®i(1) = ¡1, while the other ¯rms cannot revise their output. Ac-
cording to Lemma 1 with k = 1 this ¯rm has a higher pro¯t in quantity equilibrium
than the other ¯rms. If one period later all other ¯rms j 6= i get the opportunity to
revise their conjectural variation (which happens with positive probability) they will
all choose ®j(1) = ¡1. Hence, one mutation su±ces to reach ®(1) and, therefore,
c(H¤) = jAj ¡ 1.
Conversely, let H® be an ®-tree for some ® 2 Anf®(1)g. Then somewhere in
this tree there is a path between ®(1) and a monomorphic state ®0 with ®0
i > ¡1
for all i 2 In. Suppose that starting from ®(1) one ¯rm i experiments to ®0
i. From
Lemma 1 with k = n ¡ 1 it is obtained that ¯rm i has a strictly lower pro¯t than
the other ¯rms in quantity equilibrium. So, to drive the system away from ®(1) to
®0 at least two mutations are needed. Hence, c(H®) > c(H¤). ¤
Proposition 2 gives a result on the convergence of market interaction to the
Walrasian equilibrium that is similar to the result of Vega{Redondo (1997). Appar-
ently, pro¯t imitation is such a strong force that it also drives this more elaborate
behavioural model to the Walrasian equilibrium. Note, however, that the result in
17Proposition 2 is an approximation. It might well be that the support of ¹(¢) consists
of more states than just the Walrasian equilibrium.
A crucial assumption is the one on the maximum degree of coupling between
subsystems Q¤
I, ³, as stated in Assumption 3. This parameter should not be too
large. Intuitively, this condition requires that the interaction between subsystems Q¤
I
is su±ciently low, i.e. that the conjecture dynamics does not happen too frequent.
In Proposition 3 a su±cient condition on ~ p is given for Assumption 3 to hold.
Proposition 3 If ~ p < 1 ¡
¡3
4
¢1=n, then Assumption 3 is satis¯ed.
Proof. Let I 2 f1;2;:::;Ng. From Bauer et al. (1969) we obtain an upper bound








































I) is the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of Q¤
I. Since
Q¤




i = 1 1(q=q®(I)):







































Take µ = k(I), and ½ 6= k(I) such that q(½)i = q(k(I))i for some i 2 In. Then
Q¤(k(I);½) > 0 and ¹I
½ = 0, so that (15) is unbounded.
The maximum of the second term on the right-hand side of (14) is attained for
















since q(k(I)) is a best response to q(k(I)). Hence, we ¯nd that ¸2(Q¤
I) · 1
2 for all







































f(1 ¡ ~ ")(1 ¡ ~ p) + ~ "~ ºi(®i(I))g:
Therefore, we conclude that




f(1 ¡ ~ ")(1 ¡ ~ p) + ~ "~ ºi(®i(I))g
= 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ~ p)n <
1
4






which proves the proposition. ¤
Note that this upper bound is exponentially decreasing in the number of ¯rms,
from ~ p < 0:14 for n = 2, to ~ p < 0:03 for n = 10. This implies that, for the
Walrasian equilibrium to be the only stochastically stable state in a large industry,
the rate of behavioural change needs to be very low. In other words, leaving the rate
of behavioural change constant, this analysis indicates that smaller industries are
possibly more competitive than larger industries, since uniqueness of the Walrasian
equilibrium as the only stochastically stable state cannot be guaranteed.
5 Discussion
This paper analysed a general framework for analysing stochastic stability in models
with multi-level evolution, namely strategy and behavioural evolution. It was shown
that under certain conditions, the theory of near-complete decomposability can be
used to disentangle the two levels of evolution. They can then be studied separately
and the equilibrium of the strategy dynamics can be used to obtain the equilibrium
of the behavioural dynamics, which, in turn, is an approximation of the equilibrium
of the combined dynamics. This approach is applied to an extension of the Vega{
Redondo (1997) model of imitation in Cournot oligopoly.
19In the application, we model strategy dynamics based on myopic optimisation
by ¯rms that includes the conjectured market response to the ¯rm's own quantity-
setting behaviour which is modelled by means of a conjecture parameter. At a
second level, we allow ¯rms to change or adapt their behaviour in the sense that
they can change their conjecture. This decision is also modelled to be boundedly
rational. Firms look at their competitors and imitate the behaviour of the most
successful ¯rm.
The main conclusion of Proposition 2 is that if behavioural adjustment takes
place at a su±ciently low frequency, the market ends up in the Walrasian equilib-
rium in the long-run. An explicit upper bound for this frequency is provided and is
shown to be exponentially decreasing in the number of ¯rms. So, even with more
elaborate behavioural dynamics than e.g. Vega{Redondo (1997), evolution still se-
lects the Walrasian equilibrium. The appeal of this equilibrium lies in the fact that if
behaviour is guided by pro¯t imitation, i.e. relative payo®s, this leads to spitefulness
in a ¯rm's actions. This in turn leads to selection of the Walrasian equilibrium. The
analysis indicates that smaller industries are possibly more competitive than larger
industries.
Modelling explicit dynamic processes where players learn from the past is im-
portant, since in a "pure repeated game framework[...]history matters only because
¯rms threaten it to matter" (Vives (1999)). With learning or evolution, history
matters per se. Until recently, most models of learning are restricted to dynamics
at one level. The analysis in this paper suggests ways in which to include several
levels of evolution. This makes it possible to study both learning and evolution sep-
arately in a uni¯ed framework, i.e. the short-run and the long-run. In the example
of the oligopolistic industry: how do (short-run) strategic choices based on conjec-
tures and (long-run) competitive and Darwinian pressures interact? We restricted
ourselves to two levels, but in principle it is straightforward to extend the theory of
near-complete decomposability to more levels of learning or evolution.
Another application of the presented theory is for simulation analysis. Analysing
large dynamic agent based systems can be computationally very intensive. If one
is willing to assume relatively infrequent interactions between di®erent levels of
dynamics, the theory of near-complete decomposability can greatly reduce the com-
putational burden of these models.
20Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Since all ¯rms are identical and solutions to the ¯rst-order conditions are unique,





































k ) = 0:


























k . There are two possible cases:
1. if C0(q®
k) ¸ C0(q®0
k ), then (A.1) immediately gives a contradiction;
2. if C0(q®
k) < C0(q®0































¸ 1 and 1+®0
1+® < 1 this gives
a contradiction.
According to the mean-value theorem there exists a q 2 (q®
k;q®0
k ) such that
C0(q) =
C(q®0

































which proves the lemma. ¤
13Here the assumption that ®
0 ¸ ¡1 is crucial. For if ® > ¡1 and ®
0 < ¡1 the system of
¯rst-order conditions has no solution.
21B Proof of Lemma 2
Given a monomorphic state, the pure conjecture dynamics remains in the same







let ® 2 ¤nnA. With positive probability all ¯rms may adjust their conjecture and
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which proves the lemma. ¤
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